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SS 
by James F. Blumstein and 
James Phelan 
Jamestown Seventy 
James F. Blumstein, a co-founder and 
member of the Board of Editors of 
Law and Social Action, is a fourth-
year student in the LL.B.-M.A. 
(Economics) program at the Yale Law 
School. 
James Phelan, also a member of the 
Board of Editors of Law and Social 
Action, is a second-year student at the 
Yale Law School. 
The authors wish to express their 
appreciation to Miss Andree S. Kahn 
for her highly skilled, tireless editorial 
assistance. 
Messrs. Blumstein and Phelan 
propose political migration to a 
single state for the purpose of gaining 
political control and then establishing 
a living laboratory for experimenta-
tion. They outline some of the 
problems facing the country and point 
to three historical bases for their idea: 
the importance of the frontier in 
American history and its disappear-
ance; the traditional preference for 
local control in a de-centralized system 
of federalism; and the recognition that 
the successful communication of ideas 
is a cornerstone of democracy, as 
reflected in the First Amendment. 
They then outline some of the many 
problems that would arise in any 
attempt to implement their proposal. 
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This Is What We Are About 
Today, the United States faces 
nearly insurmountable problems that 
present structures, institutions and 
philosophies do not seem able to 
correct. We find starvation amidst 
plenty, deeply entrenched racism, 
rampant technology that threatens 
man's very existence, alienation not 
only among more and more young 
people but also among blue-collar and 
white-collar workers, an educational 
system that is a failure, a military-
industrial complex that is all-powerful 
and a gigantic bureaucratic govern-
ment that can no longer be controlled 
by ordinary people. The short answer 
to all this-Revolution-is impossible 
when armed revolt by the citizenry-at-
large would inevitably be put down by 
the military might at the disposal of 
those in control. We see the best way 
out in rededicating this nation to its 
heritage: re-opening the frontier, 
where alienated or "deviant" members 
of society can go to live by their new 
ideas; providing a living laboratory for 
social experiment through Radical 
Federalism; and restoring effective 
political communication in a 
multimedia society. 
What we advocate is the migration 
of large numbers of people to a single 
state for the express purpose of 
effecting the peaceful political 
take-over of that state through the 
elective process. The goal of this 
takeover would be to establish a truly 
experimental society in which new 
solutions to today's problems could be 
tried, an experimental state which 
would serve as a new frontier and 
encourage imaginative local innova-
tion. Furthermore, if successful, it 
would, by its example, spur change in 
society as a whole. We shall discuss 
some, but by no means all, of the 
problems that might be encountered in 
such a venture: problems of migration 
and political take-over; economic 
viability; relations with the indigenous 
population; constraints imposed by 
the federal constitutional system. 
Sporadic, small-scale migration is 
already a reality. Communes have been 
established in rural California, New 
Mexico, Colorado, Maryland, Virginia 
and Vermont. "Earth People's Park" 
envisions buying several hundred 
thousand acres of land in New Mexico 
and giving the land to people who wish 
to farm it organically. "Negative 
Entropy" has plans for moving into 
Vermont. In Virginia, "Twin Oaks", a 
settlement based on B. F. Skinner's 
ideal society of Walden Two, is now 
operating. But there is a critical fault 
in all of these movements that dooms 
them, just as similar nineteenth-
century efforts like Brook Farm and 
the communities of Fourier, Owen, 
the Shakers and the Rappites 
ultimately failed. Provisions for the 
institutionalization of continuing 
experiment and change in the 
community are lacking, as are ties to 
the larger society. Both are necessary 
in bringing change to that society and 
in preventing the choking and death of 
the experiment. Efforts of today also 
suffer from a serious lack of creative 
planning geared toward ensuring their 
long-range existence. 
Our objective in writing this is 
modest. We do not attempt to 
explicitly set out the various 
experiments that could or should be 
carried out in the Experimental State. 
It is not our purpose to draw the 
blueprint for the future society; 
rather, it is to show that the creation 
of a radical experimental state within 
the United States is both consistent 
with our past and is a viable solution 
to many problems of modern America. 
The Woodstock Generation 
The present ideological alienation 
of affluent, middle-class American 
youth who have rejected the dominant 
values, roles and institutions of 
society has been caused by the 
unquestioned exaltation of technologi-
-cal values over human values and 
corporate goals over human goals. 
Whether labeled "Alienated Youth", 
"Hippies", "Victims of the Generation 
Gap", "Student Radicals", or 
"Organic Farmers", the dissatisfied 
members of the younger generation 
are trying to develop unique social 
structures and values. This new group 
of dissidents, a product of the 
corporate society itself, finds the 
traditional road map of upward 
mobility unsatisfactory. 
Social progress in the United 
States has traditionally meant the rise 
from ethnic isolation into the 
middle class. For many of the 
immigrant groups, the struggle to gain 
access to the middle class served as a 
palliative, inhibiting the search for 
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alternative social patterns. There 
continue to be relatively large groups 
outside the middle class mainstream 
(Afro-Americans, Indian-Americans, 
Mexican-Americans, Puerto Rican-
Americans and all other "hyphenated 
Americans" 1 ), but they too are 
questioning whether inclusion in 
"straight" society is the objective they 
ought to seek. 
The recognition that the 
middle-class life itself may be an 
alienating experience poses serious 
problems for models traditionally used 
to explain patterns of social integra-
tion. The emphasis on conformity and 
predictability which underlies the 
modern technological age has 
produced a homogenized social 
structure which may prove too 
inflexible and too pervasive to allow 
significant diversity to remain 
unchallenged in its midst. But the 
presence of diversity and alienation in 
a society often serves to spur 
innovation. And unless a society 
produces effective political and social 
change, it is stagnant. 
Without at least some men and women 
sufficiently alienated to challenge the 
established order, to decry its 
assumptions, to suggest remedies for 
its faults, and to agitate their less 
alienated fellows into sufficient 
dissatisifaction, no social innovation is 
possible ... [T J he cultivation of and 
tolerance for alienation, at least in 
some individuals, is a prerequisite for 
any major social improvement. 
[However, social} effectiveness 
requires that personal alienation be 
coupled with social impact: that the 
outsider be able to communicate his 
discontented vision of his society ... 2 
Therefore, a society like ours that 
"systematically pushes its alienated 
toward private withdrawal thereby 
deprives itself of its own potential for 
self-renewal"3 and promotes cynicism 
rather than political and social 
change.4 If change is to occur, a 
radical critique of society which offers 
suggestions for reform and/or 
revolutionary change must be 
communicated. There must be an 
infusion of human-oriented values 
which hold out the hope of control • 
and constructive use of technol9gical 
innovation.5 
There is an increasing incidence of 
deeply felt cynicism among concerned 
young people, resulting in both scorn 
for traditional politics and withdrawal 
from the dominant society. Today's 
alienated generation is attempting to 
live by ideals and lifestyles foreign to 
the larger culture, and thereby develop 
a New Consciousness. 6 With this New 
Consciousness will come the under-
standing and perception needed to 
change the reality of present society. 
Nevertheless, it is becoming 
apparent that significant change is 
being frustrated by institutional and 
personal resistance. In the seventeenth 
century, the colonization of North 
America served as the real, physical 
outlet for the ideas of the idealists and 
intellectuals. But today's alienated 
generation faces a dilemma: it has an 
ideology-the American Dream, the 
Spirit of Woodstock-but no place 
where it can act upon it. 
A New Frontier 
American history is replete with 
examples of the disenchanted setting 
out for new turf on which to work out 
their own lifestyles, unfettered by the 
static, older society. Numerous 
socialistic and communistic settle-
ments were established on the outer 
edges of the American civilization. The 
Owen and Fourier movements of 1824 
and 1842 spawned no fewer than 
forty-five such experimental communi-
ties. 7 Several religious and spiritual 
communities, such as the Shakers, the 
Dunkers and the Amish, found resting 
places here. The Mormons established 
themselves in Deseret, and their 
community became the state of Utah. 
Dissatisfied with their conditions, 
thousands of people broke with their 
past to migrate to unfamiliar lands 
during the great westward movement 
of the nineteenth century. There, they 
established a society scornful of the 
older society, impatient with old ideas, 
lessons and restraints. 
The expanding frontier repre-
sented a continual social evolution and 
had an important place in the social 
development of the country. Frederick 
Jackson Turner has stated this thesis 
most strongly: 
American social development has been 
continually beginning over again on 
the frontier. This perennial rebirth, 
this fluidity of American life, this 
expansion westward with its new 
opportunities, its continuous touch 
with the simplicity of primitive 
society, furnish the forces dominating 
American character. 8 
But with the closing of the 
frontier such escape routes to change 
and innovation were cut off. The 
"safety valve" which the frontier had 
provided ceased to be available. Since, 
at the same time, expanding industrial-
ization placed restrictions on vertical 
and horizontal mobility, the growth of 
revolutionary movements within 
society was inevitable. The fierce, 
bitter Populist movement, the cry of 
Free Silver, the Coxey "armies", the 
growth of the American labor 
movement and the radical Inter-
national Workers of the World, violent 
strikes such as those at Homestead and 
Pullman, and small, unsuccessful 
activities like the Haymarket Riot all 
had revolutionary components. 
Unlike earlier malcontents, the 
dissidents of industrial America have 
had no place to go that offered any 
real chance for a new start, and they 
have thus been forced to remain 
within the social structure against 
which they had rebelled. Their 
short-lived threats left an indelible 
impression on middle-class attitudes 
which had become dominant. The 
tradition of radical social experi-
ment-prevalent in this country prior 
to the entrenchment of the Industrial 
Revolution and the closing of the 
frontier "safety valve" -was abandoned. 
Indeed, the term "radical" has come 
to have pejorative connotations in 
many sectors of society. The 
victorious middle-class has sought to 
preserve the economic gains of 
industrialization, and this has meant 
uniformity, standardization, predic-
tability, conformity and materialism. 
The history of the twentieth century, 
with its pattern of limited innovation 
followed by stern reaction, illustrates 
the inability of society to meet 
progress with equanimity. 
Therefore, a new frontier is 
needed where the New Consciousness 
can flourish. The Spirit of Woodstock 
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(the liberation of self, the belief in the 
absolute worth of every human being, 
the sense of community and love) is 
the "essence of the American 
Dream-the age-old human dream."9 
This revolutionary ideology needs a 
place to develop and thrive. But there 
is no room for it to be tested and 
nurtured within the physical, social, 
political and cultural confines of 
"straight" society. The old frontier 
had always been an alternative during 
the various stages, successful and 
unsuccessful, of the American 
experiment. Now a new frontier must 
be found to foster further experimen-
tation, an environment relatively 
unpolluted by conventional patterns 
of social and political organization. 
Experimentation with drugs, sex, 
individual lifestyl~s or radical rhetoric 
and action within the larger society is 
an insufficient alternative. Total 
experimentation is necessary. New 
ideas and values must be taken out of 
heads and transformed into reality. 
Radical Federalism 
The Experimental State would 
revitalize the experiment in federalism 
embodied in the United States 
Constitution. A brief look at history 
will show that early American 
settlements were experimental in 
design and served as outlets for 
European ideals and ideologies. Not 
only was the idea of a written 
constitution previously untried, but 
also the structure agreed upon was 
very much an experiment in limited 
central government. Since ratification 
of the Constitution, there has been an 
erosion of the power of the states. We 
shall examine three factors which have 
led to this distortion of the original 
balance in federal-state relations. Our 
conclusion is that this distortion lends 
support to the creation of a state 
dedicated to experimentation. A new 
kind of federalism-Radical Federal-
ism-must be tried so that the states 
can be restored as laboratories of 
experimentation. 
The American heritage is one of 
dissent and experimentation. The 
earliest settlers came to escape 
religious and political repression in 
Europe. After Jamestown, the first 
permanent English community, was 
founded in 1607, many others 
followed suit. These early settlements, 
however, were not static. Dissidents 
from existing colonies were quick to 
break away to form new political units 
when specific grievances were not 
dealt with to their satisfaction. Those 
inhibited by the norms of one 
community sought to set up their 
own, thereby establishing the tradition 
of local autonomy. It is this diversity 
which we would like to re-establish. 
The Pilgrims and Puritans in New 
England and the Quakers in Pennsylva-
nia were given more than an escape 
from the jails of England. They were 
given the opportunity to experiment, 
to test their beliefs in government. The 
experiment was in applied theology; 
the experiment was in government by 
pacifists; the experiment was 
successful; the experiment was 
disastrous. The period of colonization 
represented the reality of social 
experimentation for European ideas 
and idealists. 
After the Revolutionary War, the 
autonomous colonies agreed to come 
together to form a united state. The 
Constitution, upon which this 
federation was founded, reflects the 
compromise between the goals of 
union and autonomy. Local control of 
internal affairs, it was thought, would 
encourage local experimentation and 
foster bold, diverse solutions to social 
and political problems. While the 
individual states were willing to give 
up certain powers-for example, the 
right to coin money and the right to 
conduct foreign relations-they 
jealously preserved important elements 
of sovereignty. The very structure of 
the legislative branch, especially the 
Senate, illustrates the importance of 
each state's semi-autonomous status. 
The federal government was thus 
conceived as one of limited, enumer-
ated powers. The Bill of Rights, the 
acceptance of which was a pre-con-
dition of ratification for many of the 
colonies, re-affirmed the restrictions 
on federal power. The Ninth 
Amendment made it clear that the 
people retained rights against 
government, even if not specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights. The Tenth 
Amendment enshrined the states and 
the people as the ultimate sources of 
authority: "The powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people." 
The Constitution was a radically 
new experiment. It ensured social and 
political evolution to meet the 
changing needs and wishes of the 
people. Its federalist structure 
recognized the importance of 
encouraging, or at least tolerating, 
sundry local solutions to local 
problems. The genius of federalism is 
its understanding that local control 
and participation are important 
elements in governance. 
Unfortunately, the invitation to 
engage in creative innovation was not 
accepted by many states, and the 
power of the states has declined 
strikingly over the last hundred years. 
There have been at least three major 
elements in the growth of the federal 
government's power vis-a-vis the 
states: the development of a national 
market and the pressure for uniform-
ity and standardization which 
accompanied industrialization; the 
abuse of power by states in suppres-
sing unpopular political and racial 
minorities and in instituting political 
and civil disabilities against them; and 
the growth of federal revenue-genera-
ting capacity through the enactment 
of the Sixteenth Amendment, which 
permitted the federal government to 
collect income taxes without 
apportionment among the states. 
The tenure of John Marshall, an 
avowed Federalist, as Chief Justice 
facilitated the expansion of national 
control over commerce. The rapid 
economic expansion after the Civil 
War exerted even greater pressure for 
conformity and standardization. The 
federal judiciary responded by using 
the Due Process Clause as a substantive 
check on experimentation by local 
legislatures. 1 0 By attempting to 
develop and impose a unifying 
ideology, the Court suppressed 
ideological diversity and stifled local 
experiments in government. The 
courts failed to understand that their 
"ideology, whatever its internal logic, 
conflicted with ideals that it purported 
to absorb."11 The national commit-
ment to economic development 
generated pressures for providing the 
nation's producers with an integrated 
national market. The national 
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economy needed federal, as opposed 
to random state, economic regulation. 
National regulation guarded not only 
against haphazardness but also against 
local attempts at radical experimen-
tation. In one view, even the 
Progressive Movement, far from being 
the neutral, if not humane, shield 
between the people and the robber 
barons,1 2 was a "defense of business 
against the democratic ferment that 
was nascent in the states."1 3 
The modern corporation has an 
even greater need to increase 
homogeneity and conformity because 
predictability is the cornerstone of 
planning for the "Technostructure" -
John Kenneth Galbraith's term for 
modern corporate management. 1 4 
Improved modes of transportation and 
the development of sophisticated 
communications media have facilitated 
the homogenization of America. 
Uniform state legislation and the 
federal alphabet agencies have also 
played a part in diminishing local 
diversity. The "Corporate State"1 5 
has substituted for experimentalism 
the values of stability, conformity, 
minimization of conflict, standardiz-
ation, centralization, hyper-rationality 
and unchecked, directionless 
technological innovation.16 
At least two other parallel 
historical developments contributed to 
the decline of state autonomy within 
the federal system. The abuse of 
power by the states in discriminating 
against permanent political and racial 
minorities brought increased federal 
protection of individual liberties. The 
Fourteenth Amendment extended the 
fundamental guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights to the states. The federal 
judiciary has become increasingly 
sensitive to the rights of individuals 
and has moved vigorously to establish 
federal constitutional standards. And 
it is altogether fitting for the federal 
judiciary to strictly safeguard 
fundamental human rights against 
encroachment by any state even in the 
name of experimentation. This 
restraint on state power is a salutary 
development in state-federal relations; 
it should mitigate any feared excesses 
in experimental zeal. 
The last centralizing element we 
shall mention is the growth of the 
federal income tax as a source of 
revenue. While the progressive income 
tax has provided increasingly more tax 
revenue as incomes have risen, state 
tax sources have not expanded as 
rapidly. Thus, state revenues have not 
kept pace with the increased need for 
services, and the states have been faced 
with tight budgetary situations. As we 
discuss later, income generation may 
prove to be a problem in making an 
experimental state viable. In no way 
does it cut against creation of such a 
state, however. Rather, it supports the 
need for innovation in generating 
revenue and providing services. 
The last thirty years have taught 
us that centralizing the solution of all 
problems is not a panacea for social 
ills. There is a widespread feeling in 
the country today that government 
must be returned to the people; this 
means more state and local control. 
The proposed federal tax-sharing plan 
reflects the belief that the states must 
be relied on more and more for 
innovative problem-solving. As federal 
Court of Appeals Judge Griffin Bell 
notes, our federalism must be 
"refurbished and revitalized: 
There must be diversity within unity. 
This will insure the solution of social, 
economic, and political problems, 
varying as they will in the expanse of a 
nation with large geographical area and 
indigenous problems. Such a system 
should allow for many beliefs, many 
initiatives, much inventiveness and 
leadership. 1 7 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, too, recog-
nized the importance of making " ... 
social experiments that an important 
part of the community desires, in the 
insulated chambers afforded by the 
several States, even though the 
experiments may seem futile or even 
noxious to me and those whose 
judgment I most respect."1 8 
We face a dilemma. On the one 
hand, we find that "state government 
is inefficient and out-of-date ... [W] e 
have learned from experience that the 
states have not been able to serve our 
modern needs." 1 9 On the other hand, 
the federal government's solutions 
have led to alienation and resentment. 
Moreover, the cost of error and 
inefficiency on a national scale is 
frightful. 
In what direction does a way out 
of this paradox lie? Radical Federal-
ism, a reaffirmation of the role of 
significant state and local experimen-
tation, offers one very attractive 
answer. Re-establishment of the 
importance of the states will nurture 
risk-taking in political and social 
design, and is most appropriate in light 
of American history. 
Within the context of Radical 
Federalism, one state, expressly 
committed to social innovation, 
should serve as a vanguard for 
experimentation and a model for the 
change of consciousness. It is this role, 
consistent with our historical 
preference for local control, which we 




It has long been acknowledged 
that the effective communfoation of 
ideas is an essential ingredient in the 
maintenance and growth of a 
democratic form of government. The 
First Amendment's protection of free 
expression is a recognition of the .. 
importance of safeguarding open 
discussion and debate in the market-
place of ideas. Presumably, better 
ideas will prevail, and people will 
change their minds if convinced to do 
so by good arguments. Although 
Constitutional protection afforded by 
the First Amendment is limited, this 
should not restrict the encouragement 
by society of even more effective 
methods of improving understanding 
through communications. The First 
Amendment as a legal principle 
necessarily has limitations; but in 
political terms it means that the 
effective communication of ideas is a 
positive good and that the expression 
of diverse ideas should be encouraged. 
In this way, conflict can be channelled 
into the political forum, thereby 
avoiding other forms of conflict. 
Feedback of information about the 
past and present functioning of a 
political system and about the rest of 
the world is essential for a society or 
community to function in a non-
stagnating way. 
Before anyone can be convinced 
of the value of a proposition, he must 
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not only receive the message but also 
must understand it. Because in our 
technological society some methods of 
communication are more effective 
than others, the means of transmitting 
ideas may be as important as the 
content of the communication. New 
forms of media have altered our way 
of perceiving things so that oral and 
written messages may no longer be the 
best modes of communicating.20 The 
need to be heard and understood has 
led to a search for new means of 
effective expression. Recent examples 
of this search are the wearing of arm 
bands by school children in protest 
against the Vietnam War;21 draft-card 
burning;2 2 flag-burning. 2 3 As these 
incid~nts illustrate, symbolic conduct 
has become a felt necessity for the 
communication of ideas.24 Symbolic 
conduct may in some contexts 
perform the function that eloquent 
oratory or fancy prose does in others. 
Symbolic conduct is an expectionally 
vivid means of communication. It is 
more intensely emotional than the 
spoken or written word or the 
traditional cool art forms. Its dramatic 
effect is a substitute for the protester's 
lack of access to the more traditional 
mass media . ... The same voice of a 
draft-card burner would be lost in 
obscurity if its only outlet were 
mimeographed pamphlets. 2 5 
The resort to more action-
oriented symbols and the growth in 
the size of demonstrations indicate 
that even the symbolic conduct mode 
is beginning to lose some of its vitality. 
The creation of the Experimental 
State and implementation of its 
revolutionary program could be the 
next step in creating a more effective 
method of communication. 
It has been observed that "speech 
is a cool medium of low definition, 
because so little is given and so much 
has to be filled in by the listener. " 2 6 
For communication to be effective, 
the messages transmitted must contain 
information. In communications 
theory, "information" has not only 
the material reality of an event as 
such, but also is the patterned 
relationship between events. People 
will better be able to grasp the 
meaning of the radical critique by 
experiencing the reality of it as a 
concrete, living program. The 
Experimental State will permit 
dissidents to move beyond the modes 
of speech and symbolic conduct to a 
form of communication providing 
greater political information-what we 
call Purposive Action.2 7 By filling the 
observer with more data, leaving less 
information for him to supply, the 
experimenters will be able to improve 
communication by increasing his 
understanding. With the institutionali-
zation of an experimental way of life, 
people will have an opportunity to 
communicate politically by example 
rather than through mere advocacy; 
and the society, which is incapable of 
learning without experiential inputs, 
will receive a greater diversity of 
information to aid democratic social 
change. Karl Deutsch notes that ideas 
alone will not provide the solutions to 
new problems. New ideas, to be 
effective within a society, must be 
accepted by some group with power in 
the society, a group that does not 
include the persons originally 
. "t t" f h 2 ti advocating, or ag1 a mg or, c ange. 
In order to communicate their ideas, 
dissident innovators must transform 
their ideas into real, concrete 
Purposive Action. Since, according to 
Deutsch, the dissident advocates of 
new ideas will usually not be the ones 
who actually implement the change in 
society, they should remain sufficient-
ly outside the society to act, but close 
enough to influence it by communica-
tion of information. A successful 
experiment can convince a power 
group in society that an idea is 
worthwhile and viable. Purposive 
Action is, therefore, a potentially 
important part of the political process, 
a means of effectuating social change. 
Not only will the Experimental 
State provide an environment where 
people can live by their ideals in an 
atmosphere of constant social ferment, 
but it will also have an impact on the 
consciousness of non-experimenters. 
By their actions, the pioneers will be 
better able to communicate their 
ideas-their critique of society-to 
others through concrete programs of 
change. The political values which 
underlie the First Amendment will be 
served by Purposive Action as 
embodied in the Experimental State 
and its program. Society at large as 
well as participants in the experiment 
will benefit. 
Migration: The Logistics 
There are ten states whose 
population is less than 700,000.29 
Because gaining political hegemony 
over a state is a prerequisite for the 
success of this experiment, and 
because this must be achieved by mass 
migration, it would be best to choose 
one of these as the target state. 
How and where could enough 
people be found to make the necessary 
migration plan politically feasible? 
Government coercion is one 
answer, but one which would clearly 
violate the rationale of the experi-
mental design. Forced participants 
would not be dedicated experimen-
talists. If the government were to 
adopt the idea of an experimental 
state, there is a danger that it might 
view this as an opportunity to forcibly 
rid society of all malcontents 
wholesale. The re-location of the 
Japanese during World War II, though 
upheld by the Supreme Court,30 is an 
ugly reminder of the evil of forced 
mass migration. Nothing said here 
should ever be construed as a 
justification for government coercion 
in making people move to a certain 
area, or for an official policy of "love 
it or leave it". 
Voluntary mass migrations have 
occurred in the past when there has 
been a motivating force strong enough 
to overcome geographical inertia. It is 
possible that some administration 
might find the proposal for an 
experimental state attractive enough 
to offer inducements to migrate. 
Examples of government-sponsored 
migration are not difficult to find. In 
the middle of the American Civil War, 
Congress passed the Homestead Act 
which set up a land give-away program 
for those who settled on and worked 
acreage in the western territories. The 
Homestead Act is still an open 
invitation to settlers to move to Alaska 
and stake out a claim.31 Government 
policy also aided migration into the 
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United States until the first of the 
restrictive immigration laws was 
enacted in the l 920's. Examples of 
government-sponsored migration can 
similarly be found in other countries. 
One of the major policies of the 
K.rushchev regime in the Soviet Union 
was the settlement and development 
of the vast, unused stretches of 
Siberia. 
There is no reason to believe that 
government-sponsored migration, with 
the proper incentives, could not be 
successful. The real issue seems to be 
the likelihood of official government 
encouragement of an undertaking of 
this kind. Even if the unlikely prospect 
of government help should present 
itself, an important question must ·be 
rasied: whether and to what extent 
would such aid be an adulterating, 
dependency-creating element in the 
evolution of the living laboratory. 
Perhaps some kind of help could be 
accepted without endangering the 
experiment, but past experience with 
governmental aid programs augurs 
caution. It is not likely that the 
federal government would philan-
thropically provide aid to potential 
migrants without exacting something 
from them in return. Uncle Sam's aid 
to foreign governments is tied to 
purchases of higher priced American 
goods; his military scholarships are 
tied to subsequent military service; his 
welfare payments are recoverable if 
the future income of one-time welfare 
recipients rises above the poverty level. 
Dependency on the government can 
only serve to undercut the objective of 
revolutionary experimentation. As we 
shall discuss below, the constraints of 
the federal strµcture of constitutional 
and statutory law already serve as 
outer boundaries of the social 
laboratory; additional governmental 
controls and ·dependencies are 
potential threats to the openness 
required in an experimental setting. 
What motivation, then, outside of 
government support, would induce 
people to migrate to a state selected as 
a laboratory community? Economic 
welfare has been an incentive for mass 
migration in this country and in less 
developed countries throughout the 
world. A good example is the mass 
migration off the farm and into the 
cities. This migration has transformed 
the United States from a predominan-
tly rural, agricultural country to a 
heavily urban nation in a relatively 
short time period. Increased mechani-
zation and the concomitant increase in 
agricultural productivity have led to 
migration to the cities by those in 
search of lucrative employment and a 
better life. 
But, as we have seen, much of the 
migration to (and within) the United 
States has been for ideological as well 
as economic reasons. The combination 
of racial oppression in the South and 
the hope of more freedom and 
prosperity in the North and West have 
spurred masses of black people to 
migrate since World War II.32 
Religious persecution and political 
repression also have been sufficient 
motivation for migration. It is, then, 
realistic to believe that ideological 
commitment and the pioneering spirit 
could substitute for the incentive of 
economic gain. 
The massive marches on 
Washington of 1963, 1967 and 1969, 
and the huge turnout at the 1969 
Woodstock Music Festival on Max 
Yasgur's dairy farm in Bethel, New 
York, are illustrations of the mobility 
of many people, young and not so 
young alike. To be sure, the temporary 
mobility which a music festival or a 
political rally requires is of a different 
order from that of a permanent (or at 
least more than a transient) re-settle-
ment. Nevertheless, given a time 
perspective of perhaps ten years 
(though the time could be consider-
ably shorter), it is entirely possible 
that enough disenchanted, idealistic, 
adventurous and creative people would 
accept the challenge of re-settling in a 
single "frontier" state, especially once 
the word was out that a movement 
was on. 
If the government does not 
subsidize the creation of the new state, 
the costs of mass movement of people 
might prove an important barrier at 
the outset. One mitigating considera-
tion is the fact that travel costs within 
the United States are not very 
burdensome. For those with auto-
mobiles,3 3 even cross-continental 
travel is not overly taxing in terms of 
expense or time.34 Similarly, public 
transportation and group charters 
offer relatively inexpensive modes of 
transportation. Moreover, once 
political control is achieved, travel 
grants could be established to 
encourage new immigrants and thus 
maintain experimentalism. But 
defraying the initial travel expenses 
remains a thorny issue unless we 
assume, as one must, that the chance 
to live in an atmosphere of social 
experimentation will serve the same 
function that the prospect of 
economic gain has for the more 
traditionally motivated migrant. 
The major cost of moving-other 
than the cost of re-settlement-would 
be transporting household goods for 
those who had accumulated substan-
tial belongings. A family which would 
have accrued enough to make this a 
problem, however, is very likely not 
one for which the cost of moving 
would be a realistic deterrent. 
Resettlement and Expansion: 
The Economics 
Mass migration into a relatively 
concentrated area in a brief time 
period will result in acute shortages. 
Most importantly, there will be a need 
for resources to help defray costs of 
food and shelter. Of course, in the 
short run, many of the settlers will 
have some assets with which to 
procure food, but bottlenecks 
inevitably will arise in the supply of 
housing and in the distribution of 
other vital services. It is unlikely that 
the state will offer any help in meeting 
these problems if it feels threatened by 
the newcomers. Consequently, some 
independent means of support must be 
found to cover the cost of re-location, 
even though local and national welfare 
programs might provide some migrants 
with a subsistence living; when local 
communities are won over politically, 
perhaps some subsidy from their 
general coffers would be made 
available to help the later settlers. 
The cost of providing food and 
shelter might serve as a limiting factor 
in the selection of a state. In a 
warm-weather site, the cost of such 
items as heat and clothing would be 
substantially less. A state which is not 
isolated from the United States food 
supply would also prove less costly if, 
at least at the outset, food were not 
entirely home-grown but had to be 
purchased in the market. The need for 
construction of houses, libraries, waste 
disposal units and other such physical 
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capital infrastructure might serve as an 
upper bound on the pace of in-migra-
tion. However, should current 
residents move out of the state in 
response to the in-migration, the 
physical problem of caring for the 
influx of pioneers would be somewhat 
alleviated. 
But beyond the immediate 
provision of basic necessities, the 
problem of furnishing other public 
services will arise once the migrants 
establish themselve~ in various 
localities. Such functions as health, 
sanitation, fire, communication, 
transportation, utilities, education and 
security must all be accounted for in 
some manner regardless of whether 
migrants choose to establish new 
communities or settle in already 
existing communities. New forms of 
community organization may reduce 
the need for government provision of 
these kinds of services. There are 
historical examples where community 
cooperation has been able to replace in 
kind many of the so-called "govern-
ment services" now bought on the 
open market with tax dollars. The 
Israeli kibbutz, for instance, seems to 
have eliminated the use of money both 
as a medium of exchange and a means 
of storing wealth. The kibbutzim are 
relatively small communities with a 
high degree of ideological commit-
ment; the spirit of selfless labor for the 
communal welfare is not so easily 
extended to a larger community. But 
an encouraging element of the kibuttz 
experience is that the kibbutzim have 
formed a federation, and people in the 
more successful communities willingly 
provide labor services for the newer, 
struggling ones. If such a level of 
commitment could be instilled in the 
experimental community, progress 
could be made toward a non-market 
solution to the problem of providing 
community services. 
Movement away from a market-
oriented economy is not without 
problems, however. Providing services, 
even in-kind, requires the use of 
resources. The market serves a useful 
purpose, when functioning properly, 
in that it helps society allocate its 
resources in an optimal, efficient 
manner. The.movement to a com-
munal in-kind system of serving in the 
public interest raises the question of 
how the community should allocate its 
in-kind resources. How can people be 
made to reveal their preferences 
without putting a price tag on them? 
Perhaps the political model can be 
substituted for the economic model. 
Currently, decisions on government 
expenditures are governed by the 
political process in which people's 
preferences are revealed by votes, 
public opinion surveys, etc. If people 
express their choices accurately when 
tax dollars are involved, they will 
likewise do so when in-kind service is 
involved. 
Even if most of government's 
traditional service obligations could be 
met through community participation 
on a non-market basis, the problem of 
how to deal with requirements for 
capital expenditures would still 
exist: for instance, how to finance the 
purchase of a non-polluting incinera-
tor, the construction of a school, etc. 
A look at the education problem 
illustrates the need for the community 
to generate some kind of economic 
surplus. A reasonable assumption 
about those most likely to settle in the 
Experimental State is that they will be 
"quite young. In a short while, there 
may be a rapid increase in the number 
of school-age children. Whenever the 
ratio of consumers of formal 
education to those providing the 
resources for the educational output is 
high, the burden on each adult (i.e., 
non-consumer of education) becomes 
greater. Of course, the new com-
munity may decide to transform the 
traditional educational system, 
reducing the need for massive 
investment in physical facilities. Or 
perhaps the community will prefer to 
treat education as a freely marketable 
good, as foreseen by Milton Friedman. 
Under that system, everyone would be 
free to buy as much education as he 
chose, and the establishment of a 
formal, government-sponsored 
educational system would not be 
necessary.35 Or perhaps the com-
munity would prefer the system 
advocated by Ivan Illich, of equally 
distributed educational credit, used in 
any way and at any time an individual 
wants. Regardless of which system is 
adopted, the problem of providing 
resources remains. To the extent that 
physical capital is required (for 
education as well as any other public 
service), or to the extent that the 
experimental community needs to 
make use of goods and services not 
produced inside the state, the barter 
system of community cooperation will 
not suffice. If the Experimental State 
is to have economic relations with the 
other states, it must have the resources 
available to do business. 
The acknowledgment of the 
potential need for economic relations 
with other states adds a limitation to 
the scope of the state's experimen-
tation in the area of commercial law. 
Unsatisfactory commercial protection 
would dissuade outsiders from dealing 
with people in the Experimental State, 
making interstate trade more difficult 
and making it difficult and costly for 
the state to borrow money. 
If the Experimental State expects 
to purchase goods from other states, it 
must have some means of paying for 
them. Thus, the state must engage in 
some form of production, if only to 
pay for its external purchases. What 
kinds of things could be produced in 
the new state to furnish income? 
Many, no doubt, will emphasize the 
agricultural sector, hoping to export 
various farm goods. If there is a high 
level of education among some of the 
pioneers, a very mobile and profitable 
business is that of consulting. Clearly, 
some income could be derived from 
this source. But unless other work 
activity were found, the society might 
turn into another elitist culture. 
Perhaps labor-intensive, light 
manufacturing could be an area in 
which the Experimental Statewould 
have a "comparative advantage" if, by 
its barter exchange economy, it could 
keep its cost of living down. The 
production of consciousness-changing 
children's books, toys and games 
might be another source of revenue. 3 6 
The decision to maintain some 
form of industry raises several weighty 
questions. First, what control should 
the community have over the kind of 
output produced? It is clear that 
certain goods might have an impact on 
values adverse to that which the 
community desires. For example, if 
toy production is used as a source of 
revenue, the community may find its 
broad objectives foiled by the 
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and upheld, the voting age ruse 
obviously would no longer pose any 
problem. 
A state might also adopt 
intra-legislature procedure designed to 
achieve minority control, or at least 
block change.49 For example, if 
take-over appeared near, the legislature 
might require that new legislation be 
passed by a 2/3 majority. Or it could 
set up procedural rules to assure 
control to those who have seniority-
presumably the representatives with 
indigenous constituencies. Or the state 
could eliminate districting altogether if 
it believed it to be politically 
expedient. Under one man, one vote 
doctrine, there is no requirement, as 
the law now stands, that the state have a 
districted system of representation. If 
the old-liners could maintain a solid 
coalition and impose obstacles to the 
franchise on the newcomers, such a 
scheme would make it significantly 
more difficult to gain political control. 
The Supreme Court has not 
squarely dealt with the problem of 
gerrymandering. If constitutionally 
permissible, the old-fashioned political 
gerrymander might present another 
obstacle to political control.5 0 
Another ploy might pose 
problems for the pioneers. The state 
could designate certain important 
political offices as non-elective. While 
the Court has moved to protect the 
franchise where granted, it has yet to 
articulate any criteria as to when the 
elective process is constitutionally 
compelled. On this theory, the Court 
has upheld the selection of Georgia 
Governor Lester Maddox by the state 
legislature, even though he came in 
second in the popular election, a 
three-man fight. 5 1 The Court's theory 
was that there was nothing in the 
Constitution which barred a state from 
selecting its governor in any manner it 
chose; the selection by the legislature 
was deemed an alternative process, and 
thus the majority-rule principle, 
applicable only to elections, was not 
violated. Similarly, the Court held the 
one man, one vote rule inapplicable to 
a county school-board election on the 
grounds that the board performed an 
administrative function and the 
representatives of each local board 
were appointed by the members of the 
local board, not elected by the people 
of the local districts. 5 2 The local 
members were elected, but there was 
no requirement that representation in 
the county be dependent on the 
population of the local districts. Thus, 
the local population might try to 
remove election of the governor from 
popular control, have him designated 
by the legislature and, through 
gerrymandering, frustrate the popular 
will. 
Finally, the incumbent political 
group could make it difficult for the 
pioneers to institutionalize change 
through state constitutional mandate 
by making the amending procedure so 
cumbersome that amendment would 
be virtually impossible. 
The short response to this kind of 
harassment is the migration of more 
people. If gerrymandering, voting 
restrictions, etc., pose a problem for a 
marginal majority, they surely do not 
pose the same types of problems for a 
massive majority. If the commitment 
to experiment can be maintained over 
time in the face of these dilatory 
tactics, the resulting delays should be 
no more than thorns in the side of the 
nascent movement. 
Other opposition could come in a 
more ad hoc form. Local officials 
could impose hardship, for example, 
by denying driver's licenses or permits 
for various types of businesses and 
other establishments to be set up by 
the pioneers. Lawyer-pioneers could 
be denied admission to the Bar and 
doctor-pioneers denied licenses to 
practice medicine. Arbitrary public 
health regulations could be adopted, 
or existing regulations could be strictly 
enforced to harrass communes. Local 
schools could set up very stringent 
dress requirements and make 
attendance compulsory. Social 
pressures could also make life difficult 
if the settlers were dependent on the 
local residents. For example, suppose 
the local doctor refused to treat any of 
the newcomers; or the druggist refused 
to sell them any medication. Or 
suppose some of the settlers sought to 
support themselves in the interregnum 
by working in a local factory or for a 
local corporation and were denied the 
opportunity to do so. Ultimately, such 
measures could dissuade settlers from 
remaining in the Experimental State. 
As disconcerting as these forms of 
harassment might be, the most serious 
would be violent resistance. Examples 
of this reaction to threatening 
situations is all too common in 
American history. The southern lynch 
mobs and the more formal Ku Klux 
Klan of the Reconstruction Period, the 
1920's and the present offer sobering 
illustrations of extreme, visceral 
responses to threatening situations. 
The local community reactions to 
outside civil rights "agitators" during 
the history of the civil rights 
movement and during the current 
school desegregation battles in the 
South are other instances of physical 
intimidation and violence aimed at a 
perceived outside threat. Most 
recently, a group of Alabama whites, 
with the outspoken sympathy of a 
local Baptist minister, poisoned and 
shot seventy-five cows on a farm 
operated by Black Muslims, because 
they unjustifiably and incorrectly 
feared the establishment of a Black 
Muslim nation in their county. 
An appropriate illustration of 
armed conflict over political control of 
a state is the struggle for Kansas in the 
185 O's. In 1854, Senator Stephen 
Douglas won acceptance for his 
doctrine of popular sovereignty. His 
Kansas-Nebraska Bill left the decision 
of whether the new territories would 
enter the Union as slave or free states 
up to the settlers of the territory. This 
was an open invitation to the 
conflicting forces to inundate the state 
with settlers sympathetic to the 
respective sides. The result is now 
commonly called "Bleeding Kansas" in 
history texts. 5 3 The New England 
Emigrant Aid Society, an abolitionist 
group headquartered in Boston, is 
reported to have sent 1,240 migrants 
to Kansas in furtherance of its 
anti-slavery objectives. Similarly, 
southern and border states encouraged 
men to settle in Kansas for the 
purpose of gaining a pro-slavery 
majority. In the election of 1855 for 
territorial legislature, several thousand 
"border ruffians" crossed into Kansas 
from Missouri to stuff the ballot boxes 
on behalf of the pro-slavery slate. The 
territorial governor sought to void the 
election, but President Pierce 
overruled him and upheld its validity, 
even though there were 6,000 votes 
cast with a registration of only 2,000. 
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The fraudulently elected legislature 
proceeded to enact a draconian slave 
code; for example, it provided the 
death penalty for aiding a fugitive 
slave. 
In 1855 the free-soilers held a 
meeting in Topeka in response to the 
fraudulent election and drew up their 
own constitution. In 1856, they 
elected their own legislature and 
governor. Thus, there were two 
competing governments claiming 
legitimacy. In May, 1856, a group of 
pro-slavery forces raided the settle-
ment of free-soilers at Lawrence, 
Kansas, destroying homes and burning 
down the office of the free-soil 
newspaper. John Brown (of later fame 
at Harper's Ferry) and fifteen 
followers retaliated by raiding a village 
near Pottawotamie, Kansas, hacking to 
death five men who had had no 
connection with the "Sack of 
Lawrence". This led to an undeclared 
guerilla war which was to claim several 
hundred lives. 
The reason for such a detailed 
description of the situation in Kansas 
is that it is evidence of what can 
happen when strong ideological 
opponents seek to gain political 
control of the same geographical unit. 
Planning for the migration must 
include steps to avoid this sort of 
extreme episode. In Kansas, some 
evidence indicates that there was 
federal complicity with the pro-slavery 
forces who destroyed Lawrence.54 If 
such a posture were taken by the 
federal government toward the 
Experimental State, the prospects for 
violence would increase and considera-
tion of self-defense might have to play 
a greater role in planning. Needless to 
say, part of the advance planning must 
involve improving relations with those 
people who already live in the state. 5 5 
The attitude adopted toward the 
local residents will reveal a great deal 
about the ideology of the movement. 
The question is whether a political 
unit can survive with two potentially 
hostile factions vying for power. Can 
pluralism remain viable within the 
context of a radical social experiment, 
in which basic values, lifestyles and 
political objectives differ? 
Assuming that the problem of 
political control is overcome, the 
members of the experimental 
community still will be faced with a 
hostile minority faction. If the 
experimental community should 
become politically fractionalized, the 
presence of a large group of potential 
counter-revolutionaries would pose a 
grave threat to the experimental 
design. 
The first great test of the 
experimental program will be the 
safeguarding of the rights of this 
potentially dangerous minority, while 
assuring, through the political process, 
that a lasting commitment is made to 
the state's experimental purpose. On 
theoretical grounds, it would appear 
preferable to seek a solution to this 
problem by encouraging the residents 
to stay and confront the issues of 
coexistence directly. Since one of the 
ultimate goals of the experiment is to 
change the consciousness of America, 
attempts should be made to "change 
the heads" of non-experimenters. A 
willingness to make accommodations 
should be manifested during the 
earliest stages of re-settlement, in 
order to avoid potential conflict.5 6 For 
those who wish to leave, the state 
might provide travel grants to 
minimize undue financial sacrifice. 
Just as it is important to reach a 
modus vivendi with those who choose 
to remain, it is also important to 
provide a modus operandi so that 
those who want to leave would not be 
hindered by financial considerations. 
Perhaps the state ought to compensate 
them (at fair market value) for 
physical assets they might want to sell 
since the community's new design may 
have reduced the marketability of the 
property. This would also serve to 
weed out those who are uncommited 
to experimentalism.5 7 
Given the likelihood of, at best, 
strained relations between residents 
and pioneers, and given the problems 
that will inevitably follow political 
take-over, the group organizing the 
migration must make a major policy 
decision even before re-settlement can 
begin: should a specific program for 
political take-over and preliminary 
restructuring be adopted? The 
alternative would be development 
through a spontaneous, organic 
process. There are good reasons 
backing either solution. It might be 
felt that a prior plan would be elitist in 
that the members of the community 
would not be taking part in the 
development of the experimental 
design. Also, such a plan could limit 
the diversity of the new community 
because of the narrowness of its 
appeal. Clearly, if a detailed outline 
deterred significant numbers of 
potential migrants, this could lead to 
failure of the new state. Since people 
are more likely to accept something 
over which they feel they have some 
control, a prior road map should, if it 
exists, be open to alteration once 
control of the political machinery has 
been gained. 
If no formal plan is promulgated, 
the community would seek unity on a 
single objective-political control of 
the state. But even this objective might 
prove illusory and elusive if there were 
no guidelines. There is a very real 
danger of significant fragmentation 
among the settlers. The migrating 
group may be wholeheartedly in favor 
of experimentation, but there is no 
reason to believe that it will be 
unanimous in its opinions on specific 
experimental designs. While such 
diversity may well serve the goals of 
experimentalism within a pluralistic 
community, it makes the initial task of 
setting up the experimental framework 
more difficult. Internecine discord 
might choke the sense of unity, 
identity and commitment necessary 
for the success of the new state. 
Moreover, organic development of a 
program would allow the indigenous 
residents to wield influence beyond 
their numbers. If the new majority 
becomes involved in fragmented 
political bickering, the traditionalists 
might maintain the balance of power. 
This possibility is not fanciful. 
Revolutionary groups (in the United 
States and elsewhere) have had a 
history of declaring war on their 
closest ideological ally, joining with 
reactionary elements, if need be, to 
undercut their competitors. Such a 
pattern in the early stages of the 
political struggle might torpedo any 
chance for hegemony. 
Consequently, the cost of 
imposing a prior interim plan, in terms 
of anti-democratic values, might well 
be worth the gain, in terms of 
guaranteeing the success of the initial 
political take-over. Recruiting migrants 
on the basis of a definite proposal 
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Assuming that the problem of 
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community still will be faced with a 
hostile minority faction. If the 
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presence of a large group of potential 
counter-revolutionaries would pose a 
grave threat to the experimental 
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The first great test of the 
experimental program will be the 
safeguarding of the rights of this 
potentially dangerous minority, while 
assuring, through the political process, 
that a lasting commitment is made to 
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strained relations between residents 
and pioneers, and given the problems 
that will inevitably follow political 
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migration must make a major policy 
decision even before re-settlement can 
begin: should a specific program for 
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restructuring be adopted? The 
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through a spontaneous, organic 
process. There are good reasons 
backing either solution. It might be 
felt that a prior plan would be elitist in 
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would not be taking part in the 
development of the experimental 
design. Also, such a plan could limit 
the diversity of the new community 
because of the narrowness of its 
appeal. Clearly, if a detailed outline 
deterred significant numbers of 
potential migrants, this could lead to 
failure of the new state. Since people 
are more likely to accept something 
over which they feel they have some 
control, a prior road map should, if it 
exists, be open to alteration once 
control of the political machinery has 
been gained. 
If no formal plan is promulgated, 
the community would seek unity on a 
single objective-political control of 
the state. But even this objective might 
prove illusory and elusive if there were 
no guidelines. There is a very real 
danger of significant fragmentation 
among the settlers. The migrating 
group may be wholeheartedly in favor 
of experimentation, but there is no 
reason to believe that it will be 
unanimous in its opinions on specific 
experimental designs. While such 
diversity may well serve the goals of 
experimentalism within a pluralistic 
community, it makes the initial task of 
setting up the experimental framework 
more difficult. Internecine discord 
might choke the sense of unity, 
identity and commitment necessary 
for the success of the new state. 
Moreover, organic development of a 
program would allow the indigenous 
residents to wield influence beyond 
their numbers. If the new majority 
becomes involved in fragmented 
political bickering, the traditionalists 
might maintain the balance of power. 
This possibility is not fanciful. 
Revolutionary groups (in the United 
States and elsewhere) have had a 
history of declaring war oil their 
closest ideological ally, joining with 
reactionary elements, if need be, to 
undercut their competitors. Such a 
pattern in the early stages of the 
political struggle might torpedo any 
chance for hegemony. 
Consequently, the cost of 
imposing a prior interim plan, in terms 
of anti-democratic values, might well 
be worth the gain, in terms of 
guaranteeing the success of the initial 
political take-over. Recruiting migrants 
on the basis of a definite proposal 
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would offer some degree of notice to 
prospective settlers, and if the reasons 
for an advance plan were explained 
and its temporary and flexible nature 
assured, the likelihood of resentment 
would be reduced. With a broad 
strategy outlined, the settlers would 
have a unifying focus in the early 
stages of the battle for political 
control. Although the long-range 
principle must be that of continual 
social experiment, the choice between 
a specific or very hazy proposal must 
be related to the need for commitment 
and unity in the initial stages of 
political take-over. 
Another question of strategy in 
formulating a program is the pace of 
experimentation to which the 
community should be committed. 
Since one objective of the state is to 
alter existing institutions by acting as a 
model for the rest of the country, the 
most realistic approach may be to 
proceed slowly. This is especially true 
since the United States is unlikely to 
undergo revolutionary changes 
quickly. A more optimistic position is 
that sweeping re-design of the social 
system, if successful, might lead the 
rest of the country to follow suit 
without going through intermediate 
phases. The new community would be 
spared half-hearted reform measures-
themselves part of the present social 
problem-which would stifle the 
imagination and creativity of the 
members of the living laboratory. 
Obviously, this type of decision must 
be made by the participants in the 
program. Any prior plan should be so 
constructed that this major policy 
decision would not be finally 
determined until political control is 
won. 
The Community in the 
Federal Context 
One of the major limitations on 
experimentation is the place of the 
state within the federal system. The 
Constitution would serve as a 
guarantee of basic human rights so 
that the state, in its experimentation, 
could not trespass on fundamental 
liberties. This is an important 
limitation, and its impact is positive 
rather than negative. The recognition 
that constitutional safeguards must be 
ensured will reduce the kinds of 
excesses to which revolutionary 
communities may be prone. 
There are, though, less salutary 
limits which the federal system 
imposes on the states. The trend 
toward increasing uniformity and 
diminishing tolerance of deviance 
poses a severe threat to many areas of 
experimentation. Professor Alexander 
Bickel has argued that some of the 
most hallowed decisions of the Warren 
Court have become irrelevant, and 
perhaps even harmful, because they 
stifle local social experimentation.5 8 
The one man, one vote area illustrates 
this potential threat.5 9 Such sweeping 
constitutional requirements do limit 
the states' ability to experiment. In an 
era when the country is being drawn 
closer together through improved 
communications and transportation, 
the increased application of federal 
constitutional standards to local 
matters is perhaps understandable. 
Certainly, we do not argue for an 
across-the-board roll-back of the 
constitutional developments of the 
past 30 years. We simply hope that the 
Court will be receptive to genuinely 
experimental projects adopted by 
people committed to living a life of 
social experimentation. 
There are other areas where the 
Constitution may limit experimenta-
tion. The negative implications of the 
Commerce Clause, for example, 
impose a limitation on state regula-
tion. The Commerce Clause grants the 
Federal Government power to regulate 
interstate commerce, but through 
interpretation it has taken on an 
independent power. It has been held 
that the Commerce Clause, even 
without any Congressional action, bars 
state legislation inimical to national 
commerce. 6 0 And where Congress has 
not acted, the Supreme Court has 
asserted that it, not the state 
legislature, is the final arbiter of the 
competing demands of state and 
national interests.6 1 As a very recent 
case indicates the Supreme Court 
balances the interests the state asserts 
with the interest it finds in the free 
flow of interstate commerce.6 2 
Consequently, it is difficult to predict 
under what circumstances the Court 
would find that the state's interest in 
experimentation would justify the 
restrictions on commerce. Environ-
mental control, product control and 
transportation regulation all would 
face potential challenges under this 
self-executing aspect of the Commerce 
Clause. 
There is another way that state 
regulatory power is limited in the 
absence of affirmative action by 
Congress-the doctrine of pre-emption. 
When unable or unwilling to decide 
issues of state power, the Court has 
couched its restrictions on state 
regulation in terms of federal 
pre-emption.63 Under this theory the 
federal government, even though it has 
not enacted any specifically con-
flicting legislation, is said to have 
"occupied the field", thereby 
pre-empting state regulation. This 
approach, while cutting back on state 
power, has the virtue of leaving the 
constitutional issue of "power" 
undecided. 
In addition to the self-executing 
element of the Commerce Clause and 
the pre-emption doctrine, there exists 
the problem of federal legislation 
which directly conflicts with local 
regulations. In the last thirty years, the 
Supreme Court has upheld sweeping 
legislation under the commerce 
power. 64 Indeed, since the era of 
Brandeis and Holmes, the very 
character of the federal government's 
power has changed. No longer is the 
federal government's authority limited 
to the specifically enummerated 
powers in the Constitution; it is now a 
government of general powers under 
the Commerce Clause, and federal 
legislation prevails unless in conflict 
with a supervening Constitutional 
provision. An unfriendly Congress 
could therefore pose a serious obstacle 
to sweeping economic regulations 
which the Experimental State might 
want to implement. 
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The trend of expanding federal 
power means that a hostile federal 
government would have many avenues 
by which to subvert the experimental 
objective.65 Since 1937, the Court's 
tolerance of social experimentation 
has increased in conformity with the 
Holmes-Frankfurther theory of 
judicial deference to the legislative 
branch. Nevertheless, the Court's 
outlook has been national in scope, 
and the experimentation it has 
accepted most graciously has been that 
of the federal government. If the 
Experimental State is to thrive, it 
requires the Court's support. The 
Court must recognize the importance 
of re-establishing innovative state 
governments. 6 6 
Institutionalizing Experimentation 
The successful creation of the 
Experimental State does not assure its 
continuation over time. There must be 
some attempt to institutionalize the 
experimental design so that it does not 
fall prey to crippling, transient, 
reactionary movements or to 
internally generated rigor mortis. The 
problem is steering a course between 
the Scylla of excessive flexibility and 
the Charybdis of excessive rigidity. 
In the Israeli kibbutzim, it has 
been recognized that lengthy tenure of 
office may lead to the development of 
a leadership caste or an entrenched 
bureaucracy. Consequently, the 
kibbutz limits tenure of office to three 
years. There are other ways of 
requiring constant review. For 
example, all legislation might lapse 
automatically if not re-enacted every 
ten years. Or courts composed of 
members of the community could be 
triers of both fact and law-arbitration 
boards where a specific law would not 
be an exclusive, definitive element in 
the decision. Or the role of the courts 
might be expanded to that of a 
.revolutionary ombudsman6 7 which 
would maintain the laboratory 
concept by constantly referring 
arguably out-moded laws back to the 
people for re-consideration. 
Most important, however, is 
making sure that the experimental 
fervor be nurtured both through 
formal channels of education and 
through the conscious commitment of 
the state as a whole. The history of the 
Israeli kibbutzim is helpful in putting 
the problem into perspective. The 
kibbutzim are semi-autonomous 
branches of the Israeli economy. They 
are organized on a model of extreme 
collectivism with communal kitchens, 
dining halls, laundry, child~care and 
child-rearing facilities. According to 
Spiro,6 8 there were four prime 
motivations for the establishment of 
the early kibbutzim prior to Israeli 
independence in 1948: 1) to escape 
from anti-Semitism in Europe and 
elsewhere; 2) to re-constitute the 
Jewish State in Palestine; 3) to use 
physical labor (in agricultural 
production) because it was deemed the 
noblest means of self-expression; and 
4) to establish a society of equality 
and freedom. The members of the 
kibbutz see themselves as the vanguard 
of man's quest for an ideal society. 
The ideology of the kibbutz is Marxist 
in orientation, and the members see 
their role as one of changing the 
consciousness and values of the rest of 
society in order to set up a truly 
communal state. Money has been 
abolished as a form of wealth and as a 
medium of exchange, and the profit 
incentive has been elimminated. 6 9 
However, after Israel achieved 
independence the kibbutzim did not 
attract new, young members. Indeed, 
in the two years after independence, 
there was a high rate of defections: 
9.7% in 1949, and 9% in 1950, 
compared to an average of 2-3% in 
prior years. Kanovsky has noted that, 
... revolutionary movements tend to 
become conservative with age. The 
kibbutz movement, which had played 
an increasingly important role prior to 
Israeli independence, looks with 
foreboding upon its declining position 
in Israel. The older collectives pin their 
hopes on the younger generation ... 
However, the younger generation 
sees the kibbutz as a natural type of 
social order . .. a 'meshek' (an 
economy). If he decides to leave his 
meshek to live in a city or town, he 
considers this to be no different from 
a decision to choose one occupation 
than another, or to choose one place 
of residence in preference to 
another. 70 
If the state is to maintain its 
commitment to experimentalism, it 
must be conscious of the danger of 
hardening of the arteries now faced by 
the Israeli kibbutz movement. 
Through a process of self-renewal, the 
new state must sustain a high level of 
ideological fervor. In addition, the 
community must assure itself of 
continuity by keeping its young in the 
state and/or by attracting a flow of 
new pioneers. Furthermore, institu-
tionalization of the experimental 
motif will require structural as well as 
ideological steps. Successful political 
take-over is only the first in a series of 
intermediate goals along the path to 
the successful creation of a living 
laboratory. 
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